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Equilibrium of Stackelberg in the model of coordination of private and public interests

Abstract

Equilibrium of Stackelberg in the model of coordination of private and public interests

Korablina E.V., Usov A.B.

Incoming article date: 22.12.2018

The paper contains information about a stationary model of coordination of private and public interests in the allocation of resources. The study is conducted in a game setting, taking into account the hierarchy in the relations between the subjects. Take into account the subjects of management on two levels: the supervisor and the agents. Between agents occurs non-antagonistic game in which the Nash equilibrium.When modeling the interaction between the supervisor and agents, the Stackelberg equilibrium is constructed. Algorithms for solving the problem are specified, simulation experiments for a number of characteristic input data are carried out. The analysis of the obtained results is given.

Keywords: supervisor, agent, Nash equilibrium, hierarchical system, Stackelberg equilibrium, subject of management, private interests, public interests