Assessment of quality management in the organizational system in the context of corruption

Abstract

Assessment of quality management in the organizational system in the context of corruption

Agieva M.B., Agieva M.T., Popovich D.V.

Incoming article date: 24.04.2023

The behavior of the participants in the production process at the enterprise is modeled in cases of two-level and three-level hierarchy in the conditions of corruption, checking products for quality and punishing players in a number of cases. The formulas for the interaction of players and their winning strategies are given. A number of functions are standard formulas. The Stackelberg equilibrium was obtained programmatically for a two-level system in statics, for a three-level system in dynamics. The proposed formulation is based on the theories of G.A. Ugolnitsky and A.B. Usov. The results obtained allow us to identify shortcomings in a number of enterprises, as well as in theory, and continue its development.

Keywords: analytic-geometric analysis, simulation modeling, Stackelberg equilibrium, hierarchical system, game-theoretic modeling, corruption in organizations