A two-level mathematical model of optimal management of investment and construction projects is proposed. The Customer acts as the upper-level or leading control entity in the model. The General Contractor is the lower-level control entity. It is assumed that both control entities strive to maximize their gain. The target function of the leader takes into account the estimated fixed income from apartment sales, profit from the velocity of money circulation, and the average estimated payment for work. The target function of the follower takes into account the payment for work from the Customer, additional payment or a fine, and payment for workers. The information regulations of the Stackelberg game are used in the study of the model. An algorithm for constructing a solution is given. In the general case, the problem is solved numerically by means of simulation modeling. The results of numerical experiments are given. A number of conclusions are made.

Keywords: two-level hierarchical model, Stackelberg equilibrium, customer, general contractor, leader, follower