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  • Equilibrium of Stackelberg in the model of coordination of private and public interests

    The paper contains information about a stationary model of coordination of private and public interests in the allocation of resources. The study is conducted in a game setting, taking into account the hierarchy in the relations between the subjects. Take into account the subjects of management on two levels: the supervisor and the agents. Between agents occurs non-antagonistic game in which the Nash equilibrium.When modeling the interaction between the supervisor and agents, the Stackelberg equilibrium is constructed. Algorithms for solving the problem are specified, simulation experiments for a number of characteristic input data are carried out. The analysis of the obtained results is given.

    Keywords: supervisor, agent, Nash equilibrium, hierarchical system, Stackelberg equilibrium, subject of management, private interests, public interests