We present and investigate a discrete model of competitive resource allocation, taking into account the opportunistic behavior of the participants in the competition (active agents). We used the method of qualitatively representative scenarios of simulation modeling for the study of the model. The Nash equilibrium is found numerically. The dependence of the behavior of the game participants on the parameters of the model is investigated.

Keywords: corruption, competiive resource allocation, imitation modeling, qualitatively representative scenarios

In this paper, we studied a dynamic model of the production of a public good, taking into account the corrupt distribution of resources and private interests, formalized as a cooperative differential game with the Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function. The proportional and linear mechanisms of resource allocation are analyzed. As a solution of the game, the Shapley vector was chosen, which is found for test examples using computer simulation.

Keywords: cooperative differential games, corruption, resource allocation, imitation modeling, qualitatively representative scenarios