The paper is dedicated to the modeling of opportunistic behavior in electroenergetics. We considered two setups: an optimal control problem from the point of view of a separate agent and a Stackelberg game of the controller with several agents. It is assumed that the agents may collude with the controller and to diminish the data about electroenergy consumption proportionaaly to the amount of bribe. The principal attention is paid to the numerical investigation of these problems basing on the method of qualitatively representative scenarios in simulation modeling. It is shown that using of a small number of the correctly chosen scenarios provides an acceptable qualitative precision of the forecast of systems dynamics. The numerical results are analyzed, and the recommendations on the struggle with corruption are formulated. An increase of the penalty coefficient in the case of catching of the controller taking "kickbacks" or an increase of her official reward makes the kickbacks not profitable.

Keywords: opportunistic behavior, optimal control problem, simulation modeling, Stackelberg games